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Abstract 
Most private giving between living generations takes the form of “tied” transfers, such as help 
with housing downpayments. We argue that parents provide help with downpayments in 
order to encourage the production of grandchildren, and that such a subsidization emanates 
from the “demonstration effect:” a child’s propensity to furnish parents with attention and care 
can be conditioned by parental example. Parents who desire such transfers in the future 
have an incentive to make transfers to their own parents in order to instill appropriate 
preferences in their children. This generates a derived demand for grandchildren since 
potential grandparents will be treated better by their adult children if the latter have their own 
children to whom to demonstrate the appropriate behavior. Empirical work, based on waves 
1 and 2 of the National Survey of Families and Households, indicates behavior consistent 
with subsidization of the production of grandchildren and the demonstration effect. 
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1.  Introduction 
A fifth of all first-time homebuyers in the United States receive help with their housing 
purchases from relatives, mainly parents. This help is substantial, averaging over half the 
required downpayment (Engelhardt and Mayer, 1994). Parental assistance with housing 
downpayment is an example of a private transfer earmarked for the purchase of a particular 
good, that is, it is a “tied transfer.” Such transfers, though common, pose a difficulty for 
theories of private transfers. Theories of altruistic giving predict that a parent can do no 
better to enhance the well-being of the recipient child than to give cash with no strings 
attached. Any other monetary transfer could impose on the child a utility-depressing 
constraint. Theories of exchange-related giving, where the transfer is payment for future 
child services, similarly predict that the child would prefer cash. It is an efficient means of 
remuneration, leaving the child free to acquire his most preferred consumption bundle.  
Several ideas have been advanced to explain tied transfers. One idea is that preferences are 
“paternalistic,” in the sense that donors care about the composition of the recipient’s 
consumption. Another idea is that although tied transfers need not be paternalistic, altruistic 
parents give their children illiquid assets, such as education and housing, to prevent the 
children from over-consuming and being in perpetual need of parental assistance. A third 
idea is based on liquidity constraints. Adult children are likely to face severe borrowing 
constraints when trying to purchase a home. If private transfers were designed to overcome 
acute liquidity constraints, we would expect them to occur upon the purchase of a home 
when the constraints are likely to be particularly severe. 
In related work1 we point out that each of these explanations of tied transfers has 
considerable shortcomings and that a deeper analysis of the underlying motives for these 
transfers can shed new light on how parents and their adult children interact. In this paper we 
study such a motive. We argue that parents provide help to their children with housing 
because housing is complementary with the production of grandchildren. Drawing on our 
idea of the “demonstration effect” in intergenerational transfers (Cox and Stark, 1996) we 
suggest a reason as to why parents would want to subsidize the production of grandchildren. 
We focus on the possibility that a child’s conduct is conditioned by the parents’ example. 
Parents may want to take advantage of the child’s learning potential by engaging in care 
provision for their own parents when children are present and can observe their parents’ 
behavior. Parents who expect to require attention, care, and old-age support have an 
incentive to behave in a distinct exemplary manner. Such behavior gives rise to a derived 
demand for grandchildren, because potential grandparents know that they will be treated 
better by their own children if conditioning of grandchildren is at work. 
                                                                                                                                                      
1 An appendix to this paper “Liquidity Constraints and Private Transfers” is available from the authors upon 
request. 
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We empirically explore the interaction between tied transfers, liquidity constraints, and the 
demonstration effect by studying newly available data from the National Survey of Families 
and Households (NSFH) in the United States. This survey contains a variety of measures of 
private transfers between parents and their adult children as well as considerable information 
concerning intergenerational relations. We find that tied transfers appear to be driven in part 
by the transfer recipient’s fertility plans and concerns about the adequacy of the housing 
situation for the bearing and raising of children. In addition, we find gender differences in the 
intensity with which unmarried adult children are subsidized for the production of 
grandchildren: the plans and concerns of single male respondents have an especially large 
impact on housing transfers.  Further, among grandparents and potential grandparents there 
are gender differences in the propensity to give housing transfers. We show that these 
patterns are consistent with predictions of the demonstration-effect approach. Thus, our 
analysis provides a rationale for the demand for grandchildren, a relationship that has largely 
been ignored both in economics and in demography. 
In Section 2 we outline the demonstration-effect argument and briefly present and discuss 
several empirical implications pertaining to the argument. In Section 3 we present 
preliminary considerations concerning tied transfer behavior and baseline results. In Section 
4 we draw on the argument of Section 2 to explore, test, and provide a novel explanation for 
the incidence and the patterns associated with intergenerational housing downpayment 
transfers. We obtain considerable support for the demonstration-effect hypothesis. In Section 
5 we provide concluding remarks. 
2.  The Demonstration Effect 
A.  Analytical Considerations 
The demonstration-effect approach seeks to explain the provision of care, companionship, 
and other forms of assistance and attention that adult children provide to their parents. This 
is achieved by expanding the domain of analysis of intergenerational interaction from two 
generations to three: We focus on the possibility that the child’s conduct is conditioned by 
parental example, and that parents take advantage of their children’s learning potential by 
providing attention and care to their own parents when children are present to observe and 
are amenable to be impressed. We refer to this parental behavior as the “demonstration 
effect.” The idea that attention and care of parents is aimed at instilling appropriate conduct 
in children generates an array of insights and hypotheses concerning intergenerational 
relationships. One such prediction is that would-be grandparents have an incentive to 
subsidize the “supply” of grandchildren.  
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Consider a family comprised of members of three generations: a child (K), a parent (P), and 
a grandparent (G). Each person lives for three periods, first as a K, then as a P, and finally as 
a G. P wants K to help in the next period when P becomes a G and K becomes a P. To 
demonstrate to K the appropriate way to behave in the next period, P provides visible help to 
G when K is around to watch and be conditioned. It follows that aid from P to G depends 
positively on the presence of K.2 
Our theory predicts assistance from young to old even if the assistance givers are selfish. 
Thus, we can explain such assistance without relying on altruism, which may well be 
tenuous in light of biological considerations3 and existing evidence. Note that if informal care-
giving by family members living outside the recipient’s household is motivated by altruism, 
expansion of formal care-giving should reduce informal care-giving. Not so, however, if the 
motive is demonstration. Pezzin, Kemper, and Reschovsky (1996) report that in a test of a 
generously-expanded public financing of home care for disabled elderly recipients conducted 
in the United States from 1982 to 1985 (sample size of 2,955 care givers), the public home-
care provision resulted “... in only small reductions in the overall amount of care provided by 
informal care-givers to unmarried persons and no reductions for married persons.” This 
evidence of limited or no substitution of formal care for informal care is inconsistent with the 
altruistic motive for transfers. 
Neither does our argument rely on “strategic bequests” to prompt transfers from adult 
children to their parents (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, 1985). Although strategic 
considerations may play a role in some families, they cannot account for instances in which 
care is given to parents who did not accumulate appreciable quantities of bequeathable 
wealth, or where such care occurs when testamentary discretion is prohibited by law. 
To see how imitative behavior of children induces transfers from parents to grandparents and 
how the demonstration effect gives rise to a derived demand for grandchildren, consider a 
setup based on Bergstrom and Stark (1993) and on Cox and Stark (1996).  
Assume, for simplicity’s sake, and to begin with, a single-parent, single-child family. The 
parent, P, seeks to maximize the expected value of her utility, U(x, y)  where x  is what the 
maximizer does for her mother, G, and  is what the maximizer’s daughter, K, does for the 
maximizer, P. Suppose that with probability 0
y
≤ π ≤ 1  a daughter will simply imitate her 
mother’s action, while with probability 1 −π  the daughter will choose an action to maximize 
                                                                                                                                                      
2 Note that conventional theories of the allocation of time and money within the family could well predict the 
opposite effect, since young children place demands on the parent’s time and income, so that the competing 
presence of young children would reduce the assistance that P gives to G.  For additional discussion of the 
demonstration effect and empirical evidence, see Cox and Stark (1996), Ribar and Wilhelm (2002) and Wolff (2001). 
3 Hamilton’s (1964) theory of inclusive fitness predicts that parental altruism toward children contributes more to 
inclusive fitness than altruism that works the other way around.  In the words of Dawkins (1976) “In a species in 
which children have a longer average life-expectancy than parents, any gene for child altruism would be labouring 
under a disadvantage.”  
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her expected utility, aware though that her own daughter may be an imitator. Thus, a mother, 
P, chooses to maximize: 
   EU(x,y,π ) = πU(x, x) + (1 −π )U(x,y)    (1) 
where  is a twice-differentiable utility function with negative marginal utility from the first 
argument (U , because caring for G requires exertion of effort) and positive marginal 
utility from the second argument, (U , because receiving care from K is beneficial). To 
derive P’s choice of 
U
1 < 0
2 > 0
x  we differentiate (1) with respect to x  to obtain: 
    EU1 = π (U1I +U2I ) + (1− π )U1S    (2) 
where subscripts denote partial derivatives, superscript I  denotes utility if K is an imitator, 
that is, UI ≡ U(x, x) , and superscript S  denotes utility if K is a selfish maximizer, that is, 
. From the first-order condition for maximization, US ≡U (x, y)
 .  (3) ])1([ 211 ISI UUU πππ =−+−
The left-hand side of (3) is the marginal cost of transferring to one’s parent, while the right-
hand side is the marginal benefit from receiving, which, in turn, is equal to π  times the 
marginal utility of receiving from one’s child. Thus, the likelihood of not being imitated 
(π < 1)  taxes one’s transfer to one’s parent. Let us denote the solution to the maximization 
problem as x* . We can express the solution as a function of the exogenous variables, so 
that x* = x * (y,π ) . 
In the context of the present inquiry, the following two implications of this framework are of 
particular interest. First, the mother’s equilibrium choice of care for G is increasing in her 
daughter’s probability of imitation π . ( 0* >∂π∂x .) Intuitively, a higher probability that care 
to G will be imitated raises the marginal benefit of providing such care. To see this formally, 
note that from (2) it follows that 
 EU13 =U1I +U2I −U1S  (4) 
and from (3) it follows that 
 IS
S
I UUUU 2111 =

 −+− π , and 
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 .112
1 SII
S
UUU
U −+=−π  (5) 
From (2) we have .0* 131211 =++ πdEUdyEUdxEU  For dy = 0  and using (4) and (5),  
,0*
11
1
11
1
11
121
11
13 >=−−=−+−=−=
EU
U
EU
U
EU
UUU
EU
EU
d
dx SSSII
πππ  (6) 
recalling that U  and that the sufficiency condition implies S
1 < 0 EU11 < 0.   
Clearly, the prevalence of imitative behavior benefits G. This prevalence requires not only 
that with some strictly positive probability K will imitate, but also, and of course, that K exists. 
Let us then drop the assumption of a single-child family. If there is no child around who could 
imitate, π = 0 . In this case (1) becomes: 
 EU(x, y) = U(x,0) ,    (1') 
which, becauseU , is maximized with 1 < 0 x = 0 . Since the demonstration effect is 
inoperative, no transfers from P take place. We infer that G will prefer P to have a child than 
to be childless. Alternatively, let us examine the case of a family with n  children. If n , a 
given act of transfer will be imitated by each of these observing children. If each child 
behaves in the same manner, we have: 
> 1
 EU(x, y,π,n) = πU(x,nx) + (1 − π)U(x,ny) ,  (1") 
 EU1 = πU1I + πU2In + (1 − π)U1S .   (2') 
Then, P’s choice of x , x* * , is x  that solves: 
 .   (3') nUUU ISI 211 ])1([ π=−+− ππ
Comparing equation (3') with equation (3) - the case of only one child, since the marginal 
benefit is now higher (the marginal benefit curve shifts up by  to intersect the marginal cost 
curve at a higher 
n
x ), x* * > x * . Demonstration is more “productive” in the presence of 
several children than in the presence of only one child, and hence more is being transferred 
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by P to G.4 We infer that G will prefer P to have several children.5 Assuming that G controls 
resources that can be used to induce the production of children by P, it follows that G would 
want to subsidize P’s production of K. One way to subsidize the production of grandchildren 
is to give help in the form of housing, which is likely to be complementary with fertility. While 
our analysis does not yield bounds on this subsidy, it points to its existence: An expected 
gain should be accompanied by willingness to incur a cost. 
Our approach rationalizes, then, a derived demand for grandchildren that heretofore has 
been disregarded or treated in an ad hoc manner. Standard theories of fertility begin with a 
specification of the parent’s preferences and constraints, while the preferences and choices 
of grandparents are apparently ignored.6 
B.  Evidence Concerning the Demonstration Effect 
A necessary condition for the demonstration effect to work is for early life-cycle events to 
affect behavior later on. Imitative behavior must be prevalent. Thus, the first issue to 
consider is whether early childhood experience affects behavior in adulthood. In particular, if 
a child observes his or her parents making transfers to his or her grandparents, will this 
observation affect the child’s future transfer behavior?  
In our working paper (Cox and Stark, 1996) we have explored this issue using household 
micro-data, retrospective case studies, and controlled experiments. What follows is a brief 
summary of this preliminary work. Illuminating evidence comes the first wave of the National 
Survey of Families and Households (NSFH), conducted in the United States between 
March 1987 and May 1988. The survey contains information on 13,008 households (Sweet, 
Bumpass, and Vaughn, 1988). The NSFH was suitable for our initial exploration of imitative 
behavior because it contains information about in-kind transfers provided by children to their 
parents, as well as retrospective information on early life-cycle experiences. We found that 
early transfer experience did indeed affect subsequent transfer behavior. Survey 
respondents were asked if a grandparent had ever moved in with the family when the 
respondent was a child (under 19 years old). They were also asked if their own parents had 
ever moved in with them when the respondents headed their own households. The incidence 
                                                                                                                                                      
4 In the words of Hogan, Eggebean, and Clogg (1993, p. 1432) "... parent-child exchanges of support are most 
common when dependent grandchildren are present... Thus, the most appropriate focus for research on 
intergenerational support is on lineages that contain grandchildren." 
5 We interpret x  loosely, that is, as a “system of values,” a composite commodity – the caring and giving of 
attention to parents. Children who are inculcated to provide care and attention will find it hard not to do so.  With the 
giving and caring trait in place, the likelihood of free-riding when n>1 (reliance on other children providing) is low.  
Indeed, P may reason that whereas her children, as non-inculcated maximizing adults, may resort to free-riding 
behavior, grown-up children will not be so inclined if instilled with the caring trait when young. The possibility of free 
riding is further mitigated by the concern that a free-riding behavior by K upon becoming P will be imitated (having 
been so demonstrated) by P’s own children. 
6 Grandparents are not anywhere mentioned, for example, in the recent survey of fertility behavior by Hotz, 
Klerman, and Willis (1997). 
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of sharing housing with parents was 27 percent higher for the respondents whose 
grandparents had moved in when the respondents were children.  
Of course, these unconditional means may have captured much more than the 
intergenerational transmission of preferences. They could well reflect a correlation in budget 
constraints. But a statistically significant, positive effect of grandparent coresidence held up 
even when we controlled for the earnings and net worth of the respondents, and for the 
parents’ permanent income. Early grandparent coresidence increased the probability that the 
respondent’s parent(s) had moved in by an amount similar to the unconditional figures 
above. Still, these findings are open to criticism because of the omission of a potentially 
important variable – the income of the grandparents. Suppose the grandparent moved in with 
the parent because the former was quite poor. With positive intergenerational correlation in 
incomes, the coresidence of the grandparent could be picking up the effects of 
unobservables in parental income. Yet the NSFH contains information that further helps to 
mitigate the problem of intergenerational correlation of incomes. Since our approach is 
concerned with the formation of preferences, we looked at a variable that measured the 
willingness of respondents to make transfers to their parents. Respondents were asked if 
they agreed or disagreed with the following statement: “Children should let aging parents 
move in with them when the parents are too old to live on their own.” The five possible 
responses ranged from “agree strongly” to “strongly disagree.” We recognize that there can 
be considerable differences between what people say and what they do, but the respondents 
were not likely to have overstated their generosity for the sake of impressing the interviewer 
because the respondents filled out a questionnaire in private. Further, as long as any 
response error is uncorrelated with the grandparent coresidence variable, the orthogonality 
condition will be satisfied. Ordered probit, controlling for respondent and parental 
characteristics, revealed the same results as those discussed above: Having a grandparent 
move in when the respondent was young positively and significantly affects attitudes 
concerning house sharing with parents. 
While these results must be interpreted cautiously, we note that there are forces that could 
have affected attitudinal responses in an opposite direction. Having a grandparent move in 
likely diverts family resources from the child, exerting a negative influence on the willingness 
to have parents move in. Yet despite possible influences such as this, we found a positive 
effect. Our findings are consistent with evidence that habit plays an important role in 
consumer behavior (see Becker, 1992; Heien and Durham, 1991). Exposure to repeated, 
especially regular attention and care by parents to grandparents could implant a “habit” of 
care-giving in adulthood. 
We have extensively reviewed findings from the psychology, demography, and sociology 
literature and found considerable evidence consistent with our micro-data-based evidence 
reported above. We found demographic evidence that events experienced during childhood 
impinge strongly on conduct in adult life and that the family context in which children grow up 
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is important. Teenage fertility and divorce are two examples.7 Daughters of teenage mothers 
have been found to face significantly higher risks of teenage childbearing than daughters of 
older mothers. Patterns of marriage and childbearing behavior tend to be repeated 
intergenerationally (Kahn and Anderson, 1992). Children of divorced parents appear more 
prone to divorce than those whose parents stay married. 
Even if researchers using household micro-data could control perfectly for budget-constraint 
variables, there are reasons why intergenerational congruence in behavior and attitudes 
might not necessarily imply parental influence as a causal mechanism. Parent-child attitude 
similarity could be generated, for example, by the media, genetics or even child influences 
on parents (Glass, Bengston, and Dunham, 1986; Smith, 1983). While household micro-data 
studies are not informative about the causal nature of attitude transmission, our review of 
controlled, laboratory experiments of social psychologists did point to a causal mechanism 
between parental role models and child imitators. Bandura (1986) cites several laboratory 
studies showing that children mimic punishment techniques inflicted on them when given an 
opportunity to punish others. And numerous controlled experiments cited by Eisenberg and 
Mussen (1989) indicate that children’s pro-social behavior – giving gifts to others, for 
example – Is enhanced when role models increase their own pro-social behavior.8 
We started our analysis of the demonstration effect by posing the following question: 
Assuming that by setting an example parents can influence the preferences of their children, 
is there evidence that parents use this leverage to enhance their own well-being? We 
addressed this issue by investigating the effects that children of respondents have on the 
“services” that respondents provide to their own parents. The hypothesis is that in line with 
the results of our theoretical work, the presence of children will increase the quantity of 
services that respondents provide to their parents.  
We measured services by respondent-parent contact (visits and telephone calls) as, for 
example, did Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers, and we employed a long list of controls 
(both respondent characteristics and parental characteristics) in our estimating equation. In 
addition to these regressors we added a dummy indicating whether the respondent’s 
household was childless, and the number of children by broad age categories (4 and under, 
5 to 18, and older than 18). Having a child increased parent-child contact by 7 percent. 
                                                                                                                                                      
7 Further examples of imitative behavior that we reviewed in our preliminary search of the extant literature include: 
parenting techniques (Sears, Maccoby, and Levin,1957); child abuse (Bandura, 1986, p. 265); affectional closeness 
(Rossi and Rossi, 1990), and early family relationships and assistance (Whitbeck, Simons, and Conger, 1991). 
These findings are consistent with Becker's (1992) prediction that through habit formation, early life events can have 
a significant impact on behavior later in life.  
8 For example, in a typical study (Rosenhan and White, 1967), fourth- and fifth-graders face a situation in which 
they must decide whether to donate some of their winnings from a game to charity.  The treatment group is shown 
the example of a “model," (i.e., an adult who demonstrates, solely by example, the norm of giving). These children 
were more likely to contribute than those in the control group, which had no such model. Rosenhan and White also 
found that repeated examples reinforce the impact of the model on imitative behavior. 
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Further, we found that contact was sensitive to the age of children. For example, having a 
child older than 18 increased contact by 14 percent. But we also found that having several 
younger children reduced contact (mostly visits), presumably because of increased costs. 
Yet another possible reason is that having several children lessens the need for parents to 
use the demonstration effect. Suppose parents want a child to provide attention and care 
when the parents reach old age. If the likelihood that a child will give care is independent, or 
largely independent, of the presence of other children, and if there is some random, 
independent probability of a child being of a “caring type,” then a larger number of children 
translates into a higher such likelihood. 
Presumably, visits are more effective as a means of setting an example than telephone calls. 
If this is so, and the demonstration effect is important, then the composition of contact should 
be affected by the presence of children. We found some evidence in support of this 
prediction. The fraction of contact comprised of visits was higher for households with a child 
than for childless households. Further, the fraction of contact is not linear in the number of 
children. Presumably because of cost considerations, for example, having more than three 
children aged 5 to 17 was associated with a lower fraction of visits. 
We found that respondent contact with parents was responsive to income and prices. As 
could be expected with regard to a time-intensive activity, higher earnings reduced contact. 
We considered distance as a proxy for the price of contact. As expected, distance exerted a 
negative effect on respondent-parent contact. But the elasticity of contact with respect to 
distance was quite low in absolute value, which is in line with findings from other data 
sources, (for example, Klatzky, 1971). This suggests that there are few substitutes for 
parent-respondent contact. (Supplementary evidence on this issue is provided by Hill (1970), 
who interviewed three generations of 85 families about financial and in-kind transfers 
exchanged between generations. He found that survey respondents accorded to non-familial 
sources of in-kind aid and contact, such as clergy or social workers, quite a low preference 
ranking compared to familial sources.) 
The evidence appears to be consistent with the idea that parents cannot buy attention (or 
attention of the right type) in the marketplace. Presumably, with regard to a service as 
special as filial attention, the market can provide only poor substitutes.  Moreover, by its very 
nature, attention is personal and intimate, and as such is difficult to define.  Therefore, the 
transaction costs associated with an arrangement to have attention supplied from outside the 
family are bound to be quite high.  
Parental income was inversely related to contact, contrary to the findings of Bernheim, 
Shleifer, and Summers. This finding is intriguing because it suggests that the promise of a 
bequest conditional on desirable behavior as measured by contact may not be an important 
determinant of parent-child contact. Indeed, the parental income effect is consistent instead 
with the idea that contact may in part be motivated by altruism. However, part of the parental 
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income effect may have to do with the demonstration effect as well. If market consumption 
and attention received are substitutes, richer parents have a smaller incentive to instill filial 
loyalty. This reasoning could also explain the finding of Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 
that parental pension wealth was inversely related to child-parent contact. 
While the NSFH data cannot be brought to bear directly on the demonstration effect, a 
recent special module of a different household survey, the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), can.9 A large component of the HRS was designed for learning about family behavior, 
and in this regard it is akin to the NSFH. Further, since the HRS is concerned with aging 
issues it includes information pertaining to the care of elderly parents by their adult children. 
The most recent wave of the HRS, conducted in the year 2000, featured a special module 
that asked a random sub-sample of respondents directly about their motivation to provide for 
their parents. Specifically, respondents were given the following instructions:  
These next statements are about your parents. If your 
parents are deceased, please think back to when they 
were alive. Please tell me if you agree, disagree or are  
neutral about how well each statement applies to you. 
In response to the statement “I (do/did) for my parents what they did for their parents” the 
most frequent category was “agree”: 46 percent of the 1,086 households. The least frequent 
was “disagree” (25 percent), and the remaining respondents’ answers were categorized 
“neutral.” This is direct evidence that patterns of transfers to the elderly tend to be repeated 
intergenerationally by a significant proportion of households. 
While missing from the question above is any element of demonstration, another question in 
the module was phrased in such a way as to ask respondents about what they saw their 
parents do for their own parents. Again the response categories were “agree,” “neutral,” or 
“disagree,” but this time the statement was cast in the negative: “I (won't/didn't) do for my 
parents what I saw my parents do for their parents.” There was a higher concordance here 
between the generations: 52 percent of the respondents disagreed with this statement, and 
only 11 percent agreed (as before, the response of the remainder was categorized “neutral”). 
Only a small minority report willfully doing something different than what they observed their 
own parents do. While these responses deserve further scrutiny, the simple percentages 
reported appear to provide compelling, direct evidence that the demonstration effect is at 
work in the provision of care by adult children to their parents. 
                                                                                                                                                      
9 The HRS was first conducted in 1991, with interviews of 12,652 respondents from 7,702 U.S. households. 
Because it was designed for analyzing issues related to retirement and aging, at least one respondent per 
household was within the 50-to-60 age bracket.  The HRS has been conducted every two years since 1991 and it 
contains special modules of questions on specific issues for sub-samples (usually around 10 percent) of 
respondents. The information discussed below is drawn from a special sub-module in the fifth wave of the survey, 
which dealt with respondent motivation for the provision of care to parents. 
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3.  Preliminary Considerations and Baseline Findings 
Prior to empirically exploring, in Section III, the demonstration-effect rationale for housing 
downpayment transfers we consider several conventional explanations that pertain to tied 
transfers and to housing downpayments. 
A.  Tied Transfers 
Perhaps the earliest mention of tied transfers in modern-day economic theory is a section in 
Becker’s (1974) seminal paper on altruism and social interaction. Becker posits that tied 
transfers stem from the donor’s desire to encourage consumption by the recipient of “merit” 
goods, such as education and housing. Becker emphasizes a result that parallels simple 
textbook analyses of vouchers – that earmarked giving is not immune to problems of 
fungibility. On the one hand, if the recipient is contributing to the purchase of the targeted 
good, the donor might as well give a general cash transfer; tied transfers and cash transfers 
are equivalent. On the other hand, if tied transfers force the recipient to choose a different 
consumption bundle than he or she would have chosen upon receipt of a cash transfer, then 
the transfers are worth less to the recipient than their cash value. In this case, the donor 
must be motivated by more than unvarnished altruism, since he could have improved the 
recipient’s well-being by removing the strings attached to the transfer. Pollak (1988) argues 
that “paternalistic” preferences, that is, concerns over the composition of the recipient’s 
consumption, are a self-evident fact of family life. For example, most parents would not be 
pleased to learn that their contributions toward their child’s college tuition were spent at a 
luxury car dealership rather than at the bursar’s office. While the fact of paternalistic 
preferences is unassailable, however, we think that it is worth probing more deeply into the 
origins of such preferences. Pollak offers several explanations including parental concerns 
about status and about the child’s long-run interests, but in our view his list of underlying 
motivations for paternalistic preferences is far from complete. 
Becker and Murphy (1988) and Bruce and Waldman (1991) advance still another explanation 
for tied transfers. They call attention to the Samaritan’s dilemma, a problem that confronts 
altruists who interact repeatedly with their beneficiaries. Parental safety nets can lead to 
moral hazard, whereby children, knowing that they can be bailed out, work too little or spend 
too much.10  Parents might seek to counter such behavior by making educational transfers, 
or transfers of illiquid assets such as housing in an attempt to determine the child’s saving. 
While we agree that giving transfers for educational purposes might be an effective strategy 
for dealing with the Samaritan’s dilemma, we are skeptical about a similar explanation with 
                                                                                                                                                      
10For detailed analyses of the inefficiencies that can arise from altruistic preferences, see Bernheim and Stark 
(1988), and Bergstrom (1989). 
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regard to housing. Bruce and Waldman’s model contains only one asset, but in reality the 
fungibility accross several assets could thwart parental attempts to control their children’s 
saving. For example, transfers for housing downpayments might simply “crowd out” the 
child’s own financial saving. There is some evidence that is consistent with this effect. 
Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) use data from a random sample of recent home buyers in 18 
major U.S. cities and find that households who received help with housing downpayments 
had savings rates that were 40 to 50 percent lower than those who did not. Guiso and 
Jappelli (2002) examine an Italian survey of income and wealth and find that receiving help 
with housing downpayments is associated with a one- to two-year reduction in the time spent 
saving for home ownership. And while it is possible, as Engelhardt and Mayer point out, to 
partially explain some of this relationship as transfers being targeted to inherently low 
savers, there is an additional problem with the argument that housing transfers represent an 
attempt by paternalistic parents to lower their children’s consumption. The purchase of a 
house is likely to be associated with increases in other forms of spending, such as 
purchases of consumer durables, and a larger living space is likely to lead to increased 
ongoing expenses on heat, other utilities, and upkeep. 
A third explanation for tied transfers in the form of housing downpayment is that the transfers 
are a response to liquidity constraints faced by recipients. Artle and Variaya (1978) and 
Engelhardt (1996) call attention to the fact that down-payment requirements can create 
liquidity constraints for households. Lending institutions require that homebuyers pay a 
percentage of the value of the house as a downpayment, and the minimal percentage 
typically ranges from 5 to 20 percent.11  In addition, homebuyers are usually required to pay 
brokerage fees, legal fees, loan origination fees, title search fees, and so on. Engelhardt and 
Artle and Variaya show that if a household’s user cost of owning is less than that of renting, 
but the household does not yet have the necessary down-payment funds, it will be liquidity-
constrained until it saves the amount of the downpayment. Engelhardt finds that household 
consumption is depressed prior to the purchase of a house, supporting the idea that 
downpayment requirements cause households to be liquidity constrained. 
If the required downpayment truly creates a liquidity constraint, then perhaps the ‘tied’ nature 
of housing transfers is more apparent than real. The fact that transfers take the form of help 
with the downpayment is in a sense coincidental. They might just as well be viewed as cash 
transfers. What matters though is timing; liquidity constraints become particularly severe 
when the household is striving to amass enough cash to qualify for a mortgage. The 
                                                                                                                                                      
11 Engelhardt (1996) summarizes the general reasons for the down-payment requirement:  It makes homeowners 
share the risk associated with a fall in the value of the house; and it gives homeowners a stake in the property, thus 
mitigating moral hazard problems associated with maintenance of the house. Furthermore, lenders confronted with 
imperfect information about the borrowers’ probability of default and by adverse-selection problems might use the 
down-payment requirement as a device for screening out borrowers who are less likely to repay. 
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earmarking of parental transfers for housing might have more to do with parental concerns 
about children’s liquidity constraints than with housing per se. 
B.  Data 
As already mentioned, the 13,008 NSFH households were initially interviewed between 
March 1987 and May 1988.12  A follow-up to this first wave of the NSFH was conducted 
between July 1992 and May 1994. The NSFH is aptly suited for studying the determinants of 
tied transfers because it contains information on help with housing downpayments as well as 
cash transfers in general. We use information from both waves of the survey, but focus on 
intergenerational transfers that took place during the second wave (NSFH-II). The main 
reason for this attention is that in the next section of the paper we are interested in finding 
out how subsequent help with housing downpayments is related to the housing concerns 
cum fertility plans reported in the self-enumerated questionnaire in the first wave of the 
survey. In addition to questions about inter vivos transfers, the NSFH contains extensive 
information about family structure and parental characteristics which we use to construct 
measures of parental permanent income. A telephone interview with one randomly selected 
parent of the respondent was conducted in NSFH-II. This interview was similar to but shorter 
than the main respondent interview and resulted in 3,348 completed parental questionnaires. 
There was significant attrition (3,000 households) between the first and second waves of the 
survey. A third of these attriters had either died or were too ill to answer the survey. Most of 
the remaining two thirds were either refusals or households that could not be traced. (See 
the Appendix “Criteria Used to Determine the Final Sample.”) 
Since our focus is on interhousehold transfers between parents and children, we deleted 
respondents who were coresiding with a parent or with an in-law or who had no living 
parents or in-laws. We also eliminated cases with inconsistent or incomplete information 
about the spouse, missing or inconsistent housing information, missing information on 
respondent’s age or education, missing information about private transfers, or missing 
information about fertility plans. We also deleted respondents aged 65 or older and any 
households who had insufficient information for calculating permanent income. These 
sample selection criteria leave us with a sample of 5,461 households.  
                                                                                                                                                      
12 The original release of the first wave of the NSFH contained 13,017 households, but subsequently 9 
observations were found to be invalid and were deleted from the file. 
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C.  Variables 
Dependent Variables 
General Transfers. We estimate probit equations for the incidence of both “general” transfers 
and help with housing downpayments. So-called general transfers include both cash and 
miscellaneous transfers in-kind. Survey respondents were asked to report on gifts and loans 
received from friends and relatives. After being reminded that they were being asked about 
transfers originating from outside the household, each respondent was asked: 
In the last 12 months have you (or your wife/or your  
husband) received a gift worth more than $200 at any  
one time from anyone not living with you at the time?  
Include gifts of items such as a car, furniture,  
jewelry, or stocks, as well as gifts of money. 
The respondent was then asked to identify the donor (for example, a parent, a brother) and 
report the amount received. Next, he or she was asked a similar set of questions regarding 
loans, and a final set of questions were asked about transfers received for “day-to-day 
expenses or educational expenses.”13  We aggregated across these categories and netted 
out any corresponding transfers given to parents or in-laws, so that we can deal with net 
inflows. 
Housing Transfers. Survey respondents were asked a series of questions about home 
purchases made since they were interviewed in the first wave of the NSFH. They were 
asked if they purchased a home. Homebuyers were asked what were the total purchase 
price and the amount of their downpayment. They were then asked about help with 
downpayments: “Did you receive any financial gifts or loans from relatives or friends to help 
you buy or build this home?” Respondents were asked to name up to three sources of help 
(for example, parents, in-laws, siblings), and report separately the amounts of gifts and loans 
received toward the purchase of the house. 
Descriptive statistics for private transfer receipts, fertility plans, and housing concerns are 
provided in Table 1. Inter alia, the Table shows that housing transfers are quite large, 
especially when compared to general transfers. The latter occur for a little over a fifth of the 
5,461 households in our sample (Table 1, part I). About a fifth of the 1,819 households 
                                                                                                                                                      
13 The transfer modules in NSFH-II are unusual in that both the respondent and his or her spouse are given 
exactly the same questionnaire with identical wording (that is, each is asked about transfers that he (she) or his 
(her) spouse received). The wording of the questionnaire therefore implies that having either respondent or spousal 
information is sufficient for measuring transfers. In practice, however, there were several instances in which one 
spouse reported a transfer and the other did not. In these cases, it was assumed that the household received the 
positive transfer that was reported. 
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purchasing a house between survey waves received a housing-related transfer (Table 1, part 
II). Among recipients, however, the average housing transfer was five-and-a-half times larger 
than the average general transfer ($23,506 versus $4,289.) Not surprisingly, both forms of 
transfer are highly skewed, but the disparity in their magnitude holds for median values 
($9,000 versus $1,300) as well. (Table 1, parts I and II). 
An additional way to put the value of the housing transfers in perspective is to compare them 
to the value of the required downpayment. Both the mean and median of housing transfers 
exceeded, respectively, the mean and median of required downpayments (Table 1, part II). 
More than half of the recipients of housing transfers – 183 out of 345 – received financial 
help greater than the required downpayment.  
Explanatory Variables 
Respondent Permanent Income. Permanent income, that is, age-standardized earnings 
purged of transitory error components, is estimated using earnings data from both waves of 
the NSFH. Standard Mincerian earnings functions are estimated where individual log-
earnings are regressed on education, a cubic in age, occupational dummies, region, race, 
and marital status. Most individuals have two earnings observations, so we can identify fixed 
effects for them. For others, we use the technique of King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), which 
relies on outside information about earnings error components, to construct permanent 
income measures.14  
Parental Permanent Income. The first wave of the NSFH contains information on parental 
schooling, occupation, and age. We use this information to impute parental income from 
earnings functions estimated within the NSFH sample. We also use parental earnings 
information obtained from the respondent’s parent interviews.  
D.  General Transfers, Housing Transfers, and Liquidity Constraints 
A appealing explanation of inter-vivos transfers is that they are used to help recipients 
overcome borrowing constraints (Ishikawa,1974; Cox,1990; Engelhardt, 1996). Do private 
transfers appear to respond to liquidity constraints? How do housing-related transfers 
compare to the more general-purpose transfers? 
To draw inferences about the connection between liquidity constraints and private transfers, 
we use an empirical specification proposed in Cox (1990), which makes a distinction 
                                                                                                                                                      
14 Although a long panel would be desirable for measuring permanent income, even a two-year panel, such as 
ours, can significantly mitigate measurement error from transitory earnings.  Details pertaining to the construction of 
the respondents’ permanent income, the estimation of the earnings functions, and to the imputations of parental 
permanent income are provided in an appendix  “The Construction of Permanent Income” available upon request. 
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between the private-transfer effects of current and of permanent incomes of potential 
recipients. These alternate measures of income are predicted to have opposite effects on 
private transfer receipt, with the effect of current income being negative, and the effect of 
permanent income being positive. The intuition for the first result is that a rise in current 
income alleviates the liquidity constraint and lessens the need for a private transfer. The 
intuition for the second result is that with current income constant, a rise in permanent 
income increases desired consumption; since private transfers help close the gap between 
desired consumption and current income, transfers rise. 
In addition to current income and permanent income, our empirical model includes age 
interactions with the current earnings and permanent incomes of respondent households and 
parental households. The idea is that liquidity constraints are more likely to be binding for 
younger households so that the divergent transfer effects of current income versus 
permanent income would be more pronounced for them as opposed to their older 
counterparts. Further, following Zeldes (1989), we enter an additional indicator of liquidity 
constraints – whether the household’s financial assets fell short of two months’ worth of 
earnings, which we also interact with age. We also include demographic attributes of the 
household: whether it is headed by a single female, the marital status of the respondent, and 
race.15 Finally, we include the number of living parents and in-laws. 
General Transfers. We estimated and present in Table 2 a probit equation for incidence of 
general transfers received. The pattern of coefficients in Table 2 conforms to the liquidity-
constraint hypotheses: the probability of transfer receipt is inversely related to current 
earnings and positively related to the measure of permanent income, and these effects 
attenuate with age. For a household headed by a 25-year-old, an increase in earnings from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with nearly a 3 percentage-point reduction in the 
probability of receiving a transfer. The equivalent increase in the household’s permanent 
income is associated with a 2 percentage-point increase in the probability of receipt 
(although this effect is only on the margin of statistical significance). Being liquidity 
constrained according to Zeldes’ (1989) criterion, that is, holding financial assets amounting 
to less than a sixth of current yearly earnings, is associated with an increase in the 
probability of transfer receipt of over eight percentage points. Like the effects of earnings and 
permanent income, the effects of having low financial assets on the probability of transfer 
receipt diminishes with age, and each of these effects becomes negligible as the household 
reaches its forties. The measure of parental permanent income enters positively and its 
value is quite large. An increase in per-capita parental income from the 25th to the 75th 
percentile is associated with more than a 9 percentage-point increase in the probability of 
receiving a transfer.16  Having an additional living parent increases the probability of transfer 
                                                                                                                                                      
15 Cox (1987) discusses the importance of demographic characteristics of households and their role in underlying 
transfer motives. 
16 An alternative specification reinforced these results. Rather than estimating permanent income, we included its 
determinants, such as years of schooling, and permanent income indicators such as the average earnings 
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receipt by 4 percentage points, as does being married. Consistent with many other studies of 
inter vivos transfers, households headed by single females are more likely to receive a 
transfer  (+5 percentage points)  while black households are less likely to receive a transfer 
(-10 percentage points).  
Housing Transfers. A similar probit, now applied to the receipt of housing transfers, is 
presented in Table 3. Gauging the responsiveness of housing transfers to liquidity 
constraints is somewhat more complicated than gauging the responsiveness of general 
transfers because the former are given only to home-purchasers, a select sub-sample whose 
income and other attributes could be expected to differ from those of the overall population. 
In particular, by virtue of being able to purchase a house, they are apt to be less likely to face 
liquidity constraints than those who did not purchase a house.17 Estimates of the 
responsiveness of housing transfers to liquidity constraints must take into account the fact 
that such transfers take place only for the sub-sample of households who have purchased a 
home. Accordingly, we focus on housing transfers among the sub-sample of home-
purchasers. 
The estimation results for housing transfers are presented in Table 3 (which parallels the 
framework used in Table 2). The first column of Table 3 contains a simple probit estimation 
for housing transfers, conducted for the sample of home-purchasers. The second column of 
Table 3 contains estimates that take account of possible selection bias associated with the 
decision to purchase a home.18 
We find little evidence of liquidity-constraint effects for housing transfers. For example, 
having low financial assets relative to earnings appears to matter little for the receipt of 
housing transfers. None of the terms associated with low financial assets or permanent 
                                                                                                                                                      
associated with the occupations of the respondent and spouse, and age. As in Table 2, the probability of transfer 
receipt fell with earnings, and the effect attenuated with age. Average occupational earnings, an indicator of 
permanent income, was positively associated with the probability of transfer receipt, again attenuating with age. 
Years of education of the household head together with the age interaction term are jointly highly significant and 
positive. And, consistent with the liquidity constraint hypotheses, transfers are targeted to younger households. 
These results are contained in the appendix “Additional Empirical Results” available upon request. 
17 For example, the average current earnings of home purchasers is substantially higher than that of non-
purchasers - $54,510 versus $40,924. 
18 The second-column estimates in Table 3 are from a nested probit model in which the decision to purchase a 
house is modeled jointly with the receipt of housing transfers.  The specification of the purchase decision is guided 
by considerations discussed in Henderson and Ioannides (1986) and Ioannides and Kan (1996). See Table 3 for a 
list of the covariates in the housing decision equation. Estimates of the first-stage probit are contained in an 
appendix “Additional Empirical Results” available upon request. The direction of the selection bias is negative, which 
accords with our priors.  (For example, unobservables, such as having a good credit rating, would likely be positively 
related to home purchases but inversely related to help with down payments.)  But the estimated selection effect is 
only on the margin of statistical significance, and there is little difference between the coefficients in the adjusted 
and non-adjusted estimations.   
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income are even marginally significant in Table 3.19 Further, these results do not appear to 
be the artifact of possible attenuation bias from measurement error in income or assets.20 
Thus we conclude that the conventional approach to explaining private transfers, which 
relies on considerations of liquidity constraints, does not perform well.21  Does the raw 
tabulation in Table 1, part III, that suggests that housing concerns intersected with fertility 
plans are associated with receipt of housing transfers, point to a different explanation? Can 
the demonstration-effect approach better explain the patterns of intergenerational transfers 
in the form of housing downpayments? 
4. Transfers for Housing Downpayments and the 
Demonstration Effect 
We weave together our demonstration-effect approach to intergenerational transfers with our 
interest in explaining tied transfers in the form of help with house purchases. Our key idea is 
that tied transfers for housing constitute an encouragement or an inducement by would-be 
grandparents, or grandparents, to their adult children for the production of grandchildren. The 
demand of would-be grandparents for grandchildren is derived from the interaction among 
members of three generations that we have delineated in Section I. 
                                                                                                                                                      
19 When we base our liquidity-constraint variable on Wave I values rather than on Wave 2 values so as to 
measure constraints prior to home purchase, we find that receipt of housing transfers is insignificantly related to 
liquidity constraints for the younger, two thirds of the households in the sample. For the remaining and older one 
third of the households, receipt of housing transfers is positively and significantly related to being financially 
strapped. This finding is not in line with conventional views that attribute liquidity constraints particularly to younger 
households who presumably had a lesser opportunity to establish reputation in credit markets. (See for example, 
Hayashi, 1985; Jappelli, 1990). In addition, disaggregation by region – a measure of exogenous variation in housing 
prices – did not uncover any systematic evidence of a liquidity-constraint effect on housing transfers. This result 
may not be all that surprising. It could have been argued that (especially when it comes to purchasing a house) 
liquidity constraints exhibit geographical variation since house prices exhibit considerable locational variation. 
However, the incidence of a liquidity constraint that households wishing to buy a house face may not be 
systematically and positively related to the price of a house since households in, say, rural areas where house 
prices are low, also have low incomes. 
20 The NSFH data contain extensive information reported by interviewers concerning the quality of the interview, 
which allows us to investigate directly the issue of measurement problems.  Interviewers were asked a battery of 
questions concerning the comprehension, cooperation, and interest among respondents, the rapport between 
interviewer and respondent, and the extent of interruptions during the interview.  Each component of interview 
quality was gauged on a Likert scale from 1 to 7. We focused on the sub-sample of interviews rated in the two best 
Likert classifications for all criteria associated with interview quality (n=1,224).  The estimation results for this sub-
sample are similar to those reported in Table 3 and are provided in an appendix “Additional Empirical Results” 
available upon request. 
21 An alternative specification of transfer behavior reinforces the findings in Tables 2 and 3.  We estimated a 
bivariate model describing the transfer/no transfer decision, and, conditional on a transfer, whether it was housing 
related or not. Conditional on a transfer taking place, the probability that it takes the form of a housing transfer is 
increasing in recipient household income, consistent with the idea that it is general transfers that tend to be targeted 
to liquidity constrained households. These results are contained in an appendix “Additional Empirical Results” 
available upon request. 
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When children express both a desire to have children and a concern that their existing 
housing facilities constitute a barrier to having children, a tied transfer in the form of 
downpayment assistance, as compared to a pure cash transfer, neither compels the 
recipients to revise their consumption bundle nor raises their utility by less. Unlike a housing 
downpayment transfer made prior to the children having children, a promise of a cash 
transfer subsequent to having children suffers from two drawbacks. First, the promise of an 
ex post cash transfer cannot mitigate a present-day binding housing liquidity constraint. 
Second, there is a natural desire to acquire or install the prerequisites for bearing and 
rearing children prior to having children. Especially because having children is irreversible, 
would-be parents can reasonably be expected to be averse to the risk of producing children 
only to find out thereafter that they are unable to adequately house them. The intersection of 
the importance attached to a “correct” sequence and the binding liquidity constraint render 
an arrangement of children first and cash rewarded thereafter largely untenable. 
A.  Basic Results 
We augment our estimating equation for housing help by using a series of variables related 
to fertility plans and to housing concerns. In the main interview of the first wave of the NSFH, 
survey respondents were asked to report their intentions for having children. The questions 
about fertility plans were asked of female respondents aged 39 or younger, single male 
respondents aged 44 or younger, and any married male respondents whose spouse or 
partner was aged 39 or younger. Respondents were asked “Do you intend to have 
(a/another) child sometime?” Respondents were also asked how sure they were of their 
intention.  
The same age groups of respondents filled out a self-enumerated questionnaire that dealt 
with considerations in the decision to have another child. The module began with the 
statement: 
Below is a list of things that some people consider when 
having a child or having another child. Please circle how 
important you feel each is to you at the present time. 
Respondents were given a Likert scale ranging from one (not at all important) to seven (very 
important) for a variety of factors presumed to influence fertility decisions. Among these was 
housing, or more precisely, “Being able to buy a home or a better home.” We chose the top 
two numerical responses to signify that the respondent was concerned about housing in the 
fertility decision. We then created a series of dummy variables related to fertility plans, the 
certainty with which those plans were held, and concerns about housing. Specifically, we 
created the following eight dummies:  
Want child (sure), concerned about housing 
Want child (unsure), concerned about housing 
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Want child (sure), unconcerned about housing 
Want child (unsure), unconcerned about housing 
Don’t want child (unsure), concerned about housing 
Don’t want (sure), concerned about housing 
Don’t want (unsure), unconcerned about housing 
Don’t want (sure), unconcerned about housing 
The reference category comprises those respondents who were not asked the questions, 
and presumably the probability of having a child is quite low for this group, so that, for all 
intents and purposes, we will refer to this category as the infertile group. We entered the 
dummies in the probit analysis for housing transfers received. 
Our underlying idea here is that parents who are keen to set in motion or to amplify 
demonstration-effect behavior will be more willing to provide housing downpayment 
assistance when they know that the fertility outcome is relatively certain as opposed to when 
it is not. Note that the “want child (sure), concerned about housing” category is not one of a 
decisive want. Had the want been absolute, would housing have constituted a binding 
concern? The thought that parents would better assist the unsure, tilting them in the desired 
direction while leaving the sure to themselves since they will end up producing children 
regardless, is not all that appealing; the former may still not be prompted to produce children, 
and the latter’s binding constraint is unearthed. 
Our basic results are presented in Table 4. In line with a key prediction of the demonstration-
effect approach – that parents are more inclined to offer assistance to their children when the 
assistance is more likely to entail the production of grandchildren, we find that the fertility-
plan/housing-concern variables have a large impact on the probability of receiving a housing 
transfer. Those respondents who report that they are sure that they want a child, and for 
whom housing looms large in the fertility decision, are nearly twice as likely to receive a 
housing transfer as those who are sure that they do not want a child and are less concerned 
about housing. The estimates from the probit analysis in the first column of Table 4 indicate 
that the predicted probability of receiving a housing transfer for a household whose 
respondent is sure that he/she wants a child and is concerned about housing (and whose 
other variables are set at sample means) is 25 percent, compared to 13.6 percent for a 
respondent who is sure that he/she does not want a child and is unconcerned about housing. 
The predicted probability for the reference category, that is, those who presumably are not 
likely to be able to have children, is 11.1 percent. The corresponding pattern from the nested 
probit in the second column of Table 4 is nearly identical.22  
                                                                                                                                                      
22 Could our estimated relationship between fertility plans cum housing concerns and housing transfers be 
spuriously generated by a plausibly heritable, and omitted, preference characteristic, namely, altruism? Could it be 
that our findings emanate from us encountering altruistic parents – who are readily available to provide housing 
transfers – having children whose altruistic inclination renders them more likely to want to parent children? The first 
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The dummies for responses concerning fertility plans and housing concerns can be 
approximated by a linear pattern. We re-estimated the probits in Table 4 substituting a linear 
summary measure of fertility plans and housing concerns. We recoded the dummies so that 
the one reflecting the highest “needs” (want child for certain, concerned about housing) was 
given a value of eight, the lowest (don’t want a child for certain, unconcerned about housing) 
was coded as one, and the reference category was coded as zero. These results imply 
predicted probabilities that are similar to those alluded to above.23  
We also added information about the number of children in the household as regressors in 
Table 4. We included a dummy indicating if there were no children in the household, as well 
as a quadratic in the number of children. The probability of receiving housing transfers 
responds to the number of children in a nonlinear way. With other variables set at sample 
means, the probability of transfer receipt is higher when the household has two children than 
if it has one child, but it is highest when the household has no children. For example, 
homebuyers with two children are two and one-half percentage points more likely to receive 
than those with one, and one-half a percentage point less likely to receive than those with no 
children. We note though that the said responses are small relative to the fertility-
plan/housing-concern variables discussed above.24 
B.  Differences by Sex 
Our approach leads us to expect gender differences in the incentive to undertake 
demonstration effect actions because men and women have substantially different life 
expectancies: in the U.S. the difference between the life expectancies of females and males 
                                                                                                                                                      
wave of the NSFH contains useful information on subjective feelings of closeness toward parents. Respondents 
were asked to rate the quality of their relationships with their parents and with their in-laws on a Likert-type scale of 
1 (“very poor”) to 7 (“excellent”). Assuming that these measures reasonably capture the extent of intrafamilial 
altruism, we replicated Table 4, including this time these measures. Our results remained unchanged. Furthermore, 
the measures themselves, while positive, were not statistically significant. 
23 The linear restriction generated a  of 2.85 (ordinary probit) and a  of 2.80 (nested probit), versus 
2χˆ 2χˆ χ.052  
of 14.07. The marginal impact on the probability of transfer receipt of this summarized measure is 1.4 percentage 
points (asymptotic t-value = 3.59). 
24 One possible objection to our single-equation specification is the simultaneity between fertility plans/housing 
concerns and housing transfers.  Indeed, our framework implies causality in both directions: would-be grandparents 
respond to the plans and concerns of the parental generation, but such plans and concerns themselves can be 
influenced by housing transfers.  In our data, however, the reporting of plans and concerns, which is given in the first 
wave of the NSFH, substantially pre-dates the purchase of a house, which occurs subsequent to the wave 1 
interview. The time elapsing between these two events averages a little under three years, with a maximum of seven 
years. Because of the sequencing we treat the plans/concerns variable as predetermined, that is, we assume that 
the measure is independent of subsequent disturbances in the probit.  We conducted a test for weak exogeneity 
following the procedure derived by Smith and Blundell (1986), and found evidence strongly supportive of this 
assumption.  We included a residual vector obtained from an auxiliary regression of summarized plans/concerns on 
a vector of Wave 1 measures including respondent age, male and female labor force status and earnings, home 
ownership and housing equity, number of children, female headship, marital status, male and female education 
levels and financial assets.  It was not possible to reject the hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the plans/concerns 
variable for the parameters of the equation for receipt of housing transfers even at the .25 level. 
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is nearly seven years. Moreover, since wives are usually younger than husbands, husbands 
are much more likely than their wives to have a spouse present to take care of them when 
they become aged and infirm; compared to men, women are more likely to have to rely on 
children rather than on spouses for attention and care in old age. Since women have a 
longer expected horizon than men over which to reap the benefits from inculcating children, 
they have more to gain from exercising demonstration, and therefore a stronger incentive 
than men to engage in demonstration. There is abundant existing evidence consistent with 
this idea. Women provide much more help to elderly parents than men. For example, Stoller 
(1983) finds that daughters provide twice as much help to parents as sons do. Further, these 
differences are not fully explained by differential time valuation, because they are obtained 
even after controlling for wages (for example, Kotlikoff and Morris, 1989). 
These considerations imply that women would need less subsidization than men for the 
production of children, since they have a considerably stronger incentive to use the 
demonstration effect. Hence we expect that would-be grandparents or grandparents would 
be more responsive to the fertility plans and concerns of sons than of daughters.  
Another reason for expecting differential subsidization by gender has to do with the custody 
of children in the event of a marital breakup.25  Consider the case of a G with an unmarried 
P-daughter and an unmarried P-son. Suppose that parents are not interested in the quality of 
the marriage of their son or their daughter per se, but that a higher quality marriage will be 
associated with a lower likelihood of marital breakup, and that resources bundled with P 
positively affect the quality of P’s marriage. Thus, giving more resources to a daughter, 
thereby enhancing the quality of her marriage brings no returns in terms of retaining children 
upon a marital breakup, assuming that in the case of a marital breakup it is the mother rather 
than the father who retains the children. However, giving more resources to a son, thereby 
enhancing the quality of his marriage will bring returns in terms of retaining children because 
the likelihood of marital breakup will be lower. A P who retains the children is more likely to 
engage in demonstration-effect activities than a P who does not. 
We investigated separately the effects of the summarized plans/concerns variable on the 
probability of receiving housing help for married couples versus single females and versus 
single males (Table 5). In line with the predictions of the demonstration-effect approach we 
found that fertility plans/housing concerns had a much larger impact for single males than for 
single females, for whom the estimated impact of the variable is almost negligible. 
                                                                                                                                                      
25 A recent study using data from a survey conducted in 1995 indicates that one-third of all first marriages in the 
United States end within 10 years (Bramlett and Mosher, 2001). 
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C.  The Transfer Behavior of Husbands’ Parents and Wives’ Parents 
One possible criticism of the results presented so far is that the estimated effects of fertility 
plans and housing concerns on parental help with housing could in large part be due to 
parental altruism. Such plans and concerns may reflect the needs of children to which 
altruistic parents respond by making the appropriate transfers. Yet parental altruism as a 
motive for housing transfers to children should not be expected to differ by children’s fertility 
plans, only by children’s housing needs. Since differentiation by fertility plans is in evidence, 
altruism may not be the underlying motive for housing transfers. One possible way to test for 
the presence of altruistic motives for transfers is to focus on married couples and look at the 
separate effects of the income of husbands’ parents versus the income – of wives’ parents. 
The altruism hypothesis predicts that the parents of a person whose spouse’s parents are 
rich are likely to give less – a standard case of the “crowding out” of private transfers 
predicted by the altruism model.26  We investigated the receipt of help with housing for 
husbands and wives separately in Table 6.27  For husbands, we find that the income of in-
laws is inversely related to the probability of receiving help from own parents with housing, 
as the altruism model predicts, but the estimated impact is not statistically significant. But for 
wives, we find that the income of in-laws is positively and significantly related to the 
probability of receiving help from own parents with housing, a result that is in contrast to the 
altruism model. We conclude that the results we find for the connection between fertility 
plans cum stated housing concerns and transfers are not simply an artifact of altruistic 
preferences.28  
Additional results reported in Table 6 lend support to the demonstration-effect idea. Recalling 
the argument that since women have a longer life expectancy than men, they have more to 
gain from an operative demonstration effect, we entered as separate regressors dummy 
variables that capture the living situation of the parents: whether the parents are together or 
whether the father or mother is alone. (The reference category is that the parents are both 
alive but are separated.) We find that, consistent with the prediction of the demonstration 
                                                                                                                                                      
26 See also, for example, Andreoni (1989). 
27 We employ a bivariate probit technique to account for the correlation in unobservables between husbands and 
wives, which turns out to be large and precisely estimated.  Such a specification precludes us from controlling for 
the selection bias associated with home ownership, because the resulting multivariate probit model would present 
practical difficulties from the computational problems associated with trivariate integration.  Note, however, that in 
the nested models in Tables 3 through 6, estimated selection bias from the home ownership decision is never 
significant at conventional levels. 
28 If what motivates parents to furnish their children with housing assistance is a desire to have the children 
engage in demonstration effect activities, then we would expect the assistance not only to activate such an 
engagement but also to render it more likely. Specifically, does house purchasing associated with the receipt of 
downpayment assistance, as compared to house purchasing not associated with the receipt of downpayment 
assistance, result in children locating themselves closer to their parents? It turns out that home purchasers tended 
to move further away from the parents: about 110 miles further away from the husband’s parents and about 60 miles 
further away from the wife’s parents, on average. But those receiving help with housing did not move that far: those 
helped by the husband’s parents moved only 50 miles away from their parents; those helped by the wife’s parents 
moved 30 miles away. These reduced distances are not statistically significant at conventional levels, however.  
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effect approach, having a mother living alone raises the probability of receiving help with 
housing, compared to the other categories. For example, for husbands, having a mother 
living alone rather than a father living alone raises the probability of receiving help with 
housing by 7.1 percentage points (significant at the .1 level). For wives, the impact is 
qualitatively similar, but larger: 22.8 percentage points (significant at the .01 level). These 
demographic effects are consistent with the idea that it is women, and even more so women 
who experience vulnerability, who are more interested in cultivating the familial bonds that 
lead to future transfers. Again, these results would not be generated by the standard altruism 
model, which makes no prediction one way or the other concerning the differential altruism of 
mothers versus fathers. 
D.  Complementary Results  
We have investigated several additional empirical issues.29  First, we looked at transfer 
amounts in addition to transfer incidence. As is often the case with private transfers, the 
estimations of amounts are less precise than the estimations of incidence. Further, we 
investigated the connection between fertility plans and housing concerns, and general 
transfers. Following the hint of Table 1, part III, we estimated an analogue of Table 4 for 
general transfers and found that wanting a child and being concerned about housing were 
positively related to the probability of receiving a general transfer, though the estimated 
effects are less pronounced or less precisely estimated than those for housing transfers. We 
also estimated an analogue of Table 5 for general transfers and found that fertility plans and 
housing concerns did not interact with gender in the same way as housing transfers. A key 
feature of our argument concerning housing transfers is that they represent a transfer 
targeted to assets that could improve the quality of the marriage and the likelihood of the 
presence of children. We did not find the same pronounced differences in the interaction of 
fertility plans/concerns and gender for general transfers, indicating that these transfers do 
not behave in the same way as housing transfers. 
5. Complementary Reflections and Concluding 
Remarks 
By expanding the domain of analysis from two generations to three, we cast the issue of tied 
transfers in a new light. We achieve this by pursuing the idea that transfers for housing 
constitute a means for inducing the production of grandchildren which grandparents deem 
desirable in light of the demonstration effect. In addition to a new perspective of tied 
transfers, our approach provides a novel way of looking at the involvement of grandparents 
in the fertility decisions of their children. 
                                                                                                                                                      
29 The results are contained in an appendix “Additional Empirical Results” which is available upon request.  
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Most fertility models either ignore would-be grandparents or grandparents, or relegate them 
to the shadows. For example, Easterlin’s (1973) approach to fertility, whereby parental 
expectations and preferences are shaped by grandparents’ wealth, does not assign an active 
role to grandparents. It is the grandparents’ wealth, rather than their actions, which 
influences fertility. Becker (1991) accords a similarly tangential role to grandparents in fertility 
decisions: “One would expect the number of children to depend, perhaps only indirectly, on 
the income of grandparents” (p. 199, emphasis added). In Becker’s treatment of desired 
fertility, grandparent’s income serves only as a proxy of unobserved parental earning 
abilities. As in Easterlin’s model, grandparents play no active role in the determination of the 
number of grandchildren.  
An approach to fertility which could predict an active role for grandparents is that of 
evolutionary biology, but this approach suffers from a number of shortcomings. Evolutionary 
theory posits that an individual’s motivation is to maximize “extended fitness,” that is, one’s 
own expected number of surviving offspring plus the relatedness-weighted sum of the fitness 
of one’s relatives. The probability of a given gene being shared between a grandparent and a 
grandchild is one-fourth, certainly close enough to impel grandparents to be “helpers at the 
nest.” But the low levels of fertility in industrialized countries suggest that extended fitness is 
a dubious maximand. To a first approximation, the progeny-maximizing birth strategy would 
be to have as many children as possible, the effects of this strategy on child quality 
notwithstanding (Kaplan, 1994; Bergstrom, 1996). In the words of Kaplan, p. 784: “. . . it is 
likely that the low fertility behavior and high adult consumption levels characteristic of 
modern industrial society will not be explained by models of current fitness maximization.”  
Our demonstration-effect approach attributes an active role to the would-be grandparents or 
grandparents. There is an ever-growing body of evidence that in traditional societies as in 
modern societies, grandparents make substantial contributions to the production and the 
rearing of grandchildren. Kaplan (1994) studied three primitive societies and found that the 
increased demands for food generated by the arrival of children were not met solely by 
members of the parent generation—grandparents provided as well. Cardia and Ng (1997), 
using recently available evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey in the United 
States, report substantial contributions of time-related transfers from grandparents in the 
form of child care. Such behavior parallels the tied transfers to which we have referred. 
We are not dismissive of the argument that individuals want to have grandchildren because 
they like grandchildren, just as we will not be dismissive of the argument that people marry 
out of love. But while there is a rich literature on the economics of marriage, there is no 
literature on the “economics of grandchildren.” We seek to contribute to the development of 
such a literature by alluding to a vector of attractions, each capable of inducing a demand for 
grandchildren, even though we single out for close scrutiny a particular element in this 
vector. (Elements that could be included in this vector are: having grandchildren serves as a 
catalyst of bringing families closer together; having grandchildren induces “demonstration 
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effect” behavior; having grandchildren is joyous.) The admission of several attractions 
renders it necessary to devise discriminating tests. Such tests are not difficult to come by. 
Consider, for example, the joy-of-having-grandchildren attraction versus the demonstration-
effect attraction. If grandchildren are demanded regardless of demonstration effect 
considerations, then we would not expect would-be grandparents to be more attentive to the 
constraining factors for having grandchildren that sons face as opposed to daughters. Or, if 
would-be grandparents were motivated by purely altruistic considerations, there would have 
been no reason for them to be more forthcoming in providing help with a downpayment when 
the child chooses to live closer (which is a good predictor of the child’s intention or inclination 
to engage in “demonstration effect” behavior). Yet we see from Table 5 that living closer to 
the parent does indeed increase the probability of receiving a housing transfer. 
Demonstration type behavior is not the only possible means of conditioning future conduct. 
An alternative would be for parents to rely on schools or churches as a means of inculcating 
child loyalty. Yet indeed, demographic patterns for religious participation appear to be 
explained by the demonstration effect.30 In addition, anecdotal evidence from Israel 
pertaining to adults with no living parents (the generation whose parents were lost in the 
Holocaust) indicates that these adults disproportionately participated in parent-teacher 
committees, and attended religious services together with their children more frequently and 
regularly than adults with living parents. 
Can transfers from children tomorrow be prompted by transfers to children today? The 
prospect or process of “direct reciprocity” may not work out as intended, for several reasons. 
If transfers are costly and if the children’s move is the second and last in a sequence of (two) 
moves, the children may have no incentive to reciprocate. The notion that, since the children 
obviously observe their parents transferring to them they will surely be inclined to transfer to 
their parents because observation translates into inclination, can be problematic. If the act of 
the parents is replicated (as stipulated, for example, by the demonstration effect approach), 
then giving to the children today can be followed and mimicked by the children, upon 
becoming adults, giving to their children tomorrow. The combination of inculcation and 
replication can well result in transfers down rather than back. Transfers can be decomposed 
into two constituent parts: the act of the transfer and the direction of the transfer. Children 
who are exposed to their parents transferring to them can “reciprocate” by engaging in the 
act without replicating the direction. The possibility that transferring to children today results 
in the children, upon becoming adults, transferring to their children tomorrow, could best be 
eliminated if the children will not have children themselves. Yet the evidence presented in 
                                                                                                                                                      
30 In fact, in light of arguments about sex differences in life expectancy noted above we would expect women to 
be disproportionately engaged in the moral training of children.  Empirical studies of religious participation (Azzi and 
Ehrenberg, 1975; Ehrenberg, 1977) are consistent with this; women are disproportionately involved even after 
controlling for intervening determinants such as wage differences. These studies also indicate that participation 
increases with the number of school-aged children. 
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this paper suggests that the transfer to children is aimed at supporting them producing 
children rather than at discouraging them from doing so. 
Our approach can help resolve a controversy between two schools of thought in 
demography: one which advocates the idea that fertility demands are determined by the 
desire for old-age security that children provide (Caldwell, 1976), and another which argues 
that the demand for children is driven by evolutionary forces (for example, Turke, 1989). 
These two strands of thought make conflicting predictions regarding the direction of flows of 
resources and aid between generations: the first predicts a resource flow from young to old; 
the second predicts a resource flow from old to young. The debate has become somewhat 
stymied because of the preponderance of evidence indicating that resources flow in both 
directions. Such two-way flows of transfers are precisely what is predicted by our 
demonstration-effect approach. Resources flow downward, in the form of tied transfers, to 
encourage the production of grandchildren, and flow upward, in the form of help and 
assistance, as parents attempt to inculcate the appropriate values in their children. Moreover, 
when adult children provide their parents with attention and care they simultaneously provide 
their children with exemplary conduct. By expanding the domain of analysis from the 
standard two-generation format to three generations, we can explain disparate phenomena 
such as the connection between tied transfers and the production of grandchildren and shed 
additional light on the multigenerational family as an arena in which the transfer of resources, 
the provision of services, and the formation of preferences are causally interlinked. 
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Appendix:  Criteria Used to Determine the Final 
Sample 
Original NSFH wave 1 sample size:  13,008 
Attrition from wave 1 to wave 2: 3,000 
Reasons for attrition: 
Too ill 276 
Deceased 763 
No way to retrieve data 5 
Nonusable partial 48 
Not complete by end of study 174 
Final household refusal 5 
Final language barrier 7 
All tracing exhausted 733 
Clean-up tracing dead-end 13 
Final refusal 972 
Not completed 4 
Inconsistent or incomplete information about spouse 156 
Spouse’s wage missing 1 
Missing amounts for value of house purchase,  
 capital gain, or downpayment 3 
Housing downpayment inconsistent with purchase price 10 
Residing with parent 544 
Respondent’s age missing 6 
Discrepancies in respondent information on age or gender 
 between surveys 48 
Inadequate information for calculation of permanent income 14 
All parents and in-laws are deceased 3,444 
Head’s education missing 16 
Respondent aged 65 or older 132 
Missing information on private transfers 105 
Missing information about ability to have, or  
 desire for more children 68 
Final sample size  5,461 
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Table 1. Some Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
I. General Transfers 
 
 
                                                         Number    Percent 
 
Households in the sample                                  5,461    100.00 
Households who received general transfers                 1,178     21.57 
 
 
                                                         Mean      Median 
 
 
Value of general transfer among recipients               $4,289    $1,300 
 
 
II. Housing transfers 
 
 
                                                         Number    Percent  (Percent of 
                                                                             Subsample) 
 
 
Households in the sample                                  5,461    100.00     --- 
Households who purchased a house between survey waves     1,819     33.31   (100.00) 
Households who received help with house purchase            345      6.32    (18.97) 
Households whose help exceeded the required down payment    183      3.35    (10.06) 
 
 
                                                         Mean      Median 
 
 
Value of housing transfer among recipients               $23,506   $9,000 
Required down payments                                   $17,120   $8,000 
 
 
III. Fertility plans and housing concerns 
 
 
                                               Recipients of      Nonrecipients of 
                                               housing transfer   housing transfer 
 
 
                                            Number    Percent     Number    Percent 
 
 
Households who purchased a                     345    100.00       1,474    100.00 
house between survey 
waves 
 
 
Households who are sure                        129     37.39         327     22.18 
that they want a(nother) 
child 
 
 
Households who want 
a(nother) child and 
have housing concerns                           71     20.58         144      9.77 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' tabulations from the NSFH. 
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Table 2. The Incidence of General Transfers 
Dependent Variable: Transfer Receipt (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                    Marginal        Asymp.     Variable 
                                     effect         t-val.       mean 
Respondent Characteristics 
 
Current earnings                  -0.020 X 10-4th   -2.16      45,483 
 
Permanent income                   0.014 X 10-4th    1.29      41,426 
 
Current earnings X age
(a)   
         0.050 X 10-6th    2.17   1,830,111 
 
Permanent income X age            -0.028 X 10-6th   -1.00   1,639,971 
 
Financial assets < 1/6th earnings  0.167             3.39        0.39 
 
Fin. assets < 1/6th earn. X age   -0.003            -2.62       14.59 
 
Per-capita parental income
(b)   
     0.107 X 10-4th   11.09      14,170 
 
Number of living parents + inlaws  0.044             5.96        2.36 
 
Married, spouse present            0.043             1.99        0.65 
 
Female-headed household            0.049             2.13        0.25 
 
Black                             -0.096            -5.43        0.13 
 
Constant                           0.024           -20.55        1.00 
 
Number of observations                              5,461 
    Recipients                                      1,178 
    Nonrecipients                                   4,283 
 
Log-likelihood                                     -2615.19 
Chi-squared                                          464.64 
Dependent variable mean                                0.22 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' tabulations using the NSFH. 
(a) 'X age' denotes variable interacted with age of household head. 
(b) Income of parents plus in-laws divided by the number of living parents 
plus in-laws. 
 
36 — Cox, Stark / On the Demand for Grandchildren — I H S 
Table 3. The Incidence of Housing Transfers: 
Households Who Purchased a House Between Survey Waves 
Dependent Variable:  Transfer Receipt (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                           Probit   Nested   Probit 
                                 Marginal  Asymp.  Marginal  Asymp.  Variable 
                                  effect   t-val.   Effect   t-val.    mean 
Respondent Characteristics  
 
Current earnings (000's)            0.002   0.98    0.001    0.87    54.51 
  
Permanent income (000's)            0.002   0.85    0.001    0.62    48.58 
 
Current earnings (000's) X age/100 -0.006  -1.14   -0.004   -1.09    20.68 
 
Permanent income (000's) X age/100 -0.003  -0.55   -0.002   -0.40    18.15 
 
Financial assets < 1/6th earnings  -0.025  -0.29   -0.025   -0.29     0.37 
 
Fin. assets < 1/6th earnings X age  0.002   0.86    0.002    0.92    13.37 
 
Per-capita parental income (000's)  0.008   4.63    0.006    4.44    15.61 
 
Number of living parents/inlaws     0.044   3.46    0.036    3.07     2.70 
 
Married, spouse present             0.007   0.18    0.007   -0.10     0.75 
 
Female-headed household             0.045   1.00    0.041    0.94     0.17 
 
Black                              -0.110  -2.89   -0.092   -2.52     0.06 
 
Constant                            0.020 -10.36    0.021   -5.83     1.00 
 
Number of observations                    1,819               1,819 
    Recipients                              345                 345 
    Nonrecipients                         1,474               1,474 
 
Log-likelihood                             -813.57         -3777.93 
Chi-squared                                 139.97            77.92 
Dependent variable mean                       0.19             0.19 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' tabulations using the NSFH. 
Note: The nested probit adjusts for the sample-selection bias associated 
with restriction of the sample to homebuyers. Purchasing a house, and 
receiving a housing-related transfer are estimated jointly. Variables 
entered in the house purchase equation are earnings, permanent income, 
financial assets, dummies for financial assets missing and for low financial 
assets, a quadratic in the age of the household head, per-capita parental 
income, number of living parents/in-laws, family size, the amount of housing 
equity in wave 1, marital status (married, divorced, married since wave 1), 
female headship status, race (Black), dummy indicating missing value for 
wave 1 home equity, a dummy for inter-city migration since wave 1, dummies 
for job change (respondent and spouse) since wave 1, and dummies for 
attaining a job (respondent and spouse) since wave 1. Estimated correlation 
between unobservables in the house purchase equation and housing transfer 
equation: -0.245, std. err. =  0.125. The probit equation for house purchase 
is given in the Appendix “Additional Results,” available on request. 
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Table 4. The Incidence of Housing Transfers: 
Households Who Purchased a House Between Survey Waves 
Dependent Variable:  Transfer Receipt (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                          Probit             Nested Probit 
 
                                    Marginal   Asymp.      Marginal   Asymp.    Variable 
                                     effect    t-val.       Effect    t-val.      mean 
Respondent Characteristics 
 
Current earnings (000's)               0.002     0.90         0.001     0.81     54.51 
Permanent income (000's)              -0.0002   -0.09        -0.0003   -0.24     48.58 
Current earnings (000's) X age/100    -0.005    -1.07        -0.004    -1.03     20.68 
Permanent income (000's) X age/100     0.002     0.32         0.002     0.42     18.15 
Financial assets < 1/6th earnings     -0.080    -0.96        -0.066    -0.94      0.37 
Fin. assets < 1/6th earnings X age     0.004     1.62         0.003     1.66     13.37 
Per-capita parental income (000's)     0.007     4.23         0.005     4.09     15.61 
Number of living parents/inlaws        0.039     3.10         0.032     2.79      2.70 
Married, spouse present                0.031     0.74         0.025     0.47      0.75 
Female-headed household                0.071     1.51         0.059     1.43      0.17 
Black                                 -0.107    -2.89        -0.089    -2.57      0.06 
No children                            0.110     1.84         0.091     1.89      0.30 
Number of children                     0.103     2.09         0.085     2.15      1.44 
Number of children squared            -0.025    -2.42        -0.021    -2.46      3.67 
 
 
Fertility-Plan & Housing-Concern Variables 
 
 
Want child (sure), concerned           0.164     3.92         0.136     3.77      0.12 
Want child (unsure), concerned         0.114     2.97         0.092     2.85      0.12 
Want child (sure), unconcerned         0.081     2.24         0.065     2.15      0.13 
Want child (unsure), unconcerned       0.070     1.90         0.056     1.84      0.12 
Don't want (unsure), concerned         0.079     1.58         0.061     1.49      0.05 
Don't want (sure), concerned           0.045     0.76         0.036     0.74      0.03 
Don't want (unsure), unconcerned       0.092     1.90         0.077     1.90      0.05 
Don't want (sure), unconcerned         0.032     0.67         0.025     0.64      0.05 
 
Constant                               0.004    -8.79         0.023    -6.29      1.00 
 
Number of observations                         1,819                  1,819 
    Recipients                                   345                    345 
    Nonrecipients                              1,474                  1,474 
 
Log-likelihood                                 -799.21             -3764.04 
Chi-squared                                     168.69                98.57 
Dependent variable mean                           0.19                 0.19 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' tabulations using the NSFH. 
Note: The nested probit adjusts for the sample-selection bias associated with 
restriction of the sample to homebuyers. Purchasing a house, and receiving a housing-
related transfer are estimated jointly. Variables entered in the house purchase 
equation are earnings, permanent income, financial assets, dummies for financial 
assets missing and for low financial assets, a quadratic in the age of the household 
head, per-capita parental income, number of living parents/in-laws, family size, the 
amount of housing equity in wave 1, marital status (married, divorced, married since 
wave 1), female headship status, race (Black), dummy indicating missing value for 
wave 1 home equity, a dummy for inter-city migration since wave 1, dummies for job 
change (respondent and spouse) since wave 1, and dummies for attaining a job 
(respondent and spouse) since wave 1. Estimated correlation between unobservables in 
the house purchase equation and housing transfer equation: -0.214, std. err. = 0.126. 
The probit equation for house purchase is given in the Appendix “Additional Results,” 
available on request. 
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Table 5. The Incidence of Housing Transfers: 
Households Who Purchased a House Between Survey Waves 
Fertility-Plan Cum Housing-Concern Variable Entered Interactively 
Dependent Variable:  Transfer Receipt (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                          Probit             Nested Probit 
 
                                    Marginal    Asymp.   Marginal    Asymp.  Variable 
                                     effect     t-val.    Effect     t-val.    mean 
Respondent Characteristics 
 
Current earnings (000's)               0.002     1.07       0.001     0.97    54.54 
Permanent income (000's)              -0.0003   -0.15      -0.0004   -0.35    48.59 
Current earnings (000's) X age/100    -0.006    -1.21      -0.004    -1.16    20.69 
Permanent income (000's) X age/100     0.002     0.30       0.002     0.43    18.15 
Financial assets < 1/6th earnings     -0.059    -0.72      -0.050    -0.70     0.37 
Fin. assets < 1/6th earnings X age     0.003     1.39       0.003     1.43    13.33 
Per-capita parental income (000's)     0.007     4.26       0.005     4.16    15.62 
Number of living parents/inlaws        0.036     2.86       0.029     2.52     2.70 
Married, spouse present                0.195     2.28       0.176     2.14     0.75 
Female-headed household                0.400     2.57       0.340     2.57     0.17 
Black                                 -0.092    -2.41      -0.075    -2.04     0.06 
Distance                              -0.150    -2.07      -0.130    -2.25    -0.08 
Number of siblings                    -0.013    -2.46      -0.010    -2.36     5.87 
Childless                              0.125     1.89       0.104     1.97     0.30 
Number of children                     0.101     2.12       0.083     2.19     1.44 
Number of children squared            -0.024    -2.35      -0.019    -2.41     3.67 
 
 
Fertility-Plan & Housing-Concern Variables 
 
 
Plans & Concerns (P&C)                 0.012     1.55       0.009     1.51     3.68 
P&C*Single female                     -0.013    -1.48      -0.011    -1.62     0.53 
P&C*Single male                        0.037     1.99       0.030     1.99     0.31 
P&C*Distance                           0.023     1.33       0.017     1.23    -0.27 
P&C*Siblings                           0.001     0.99       0.001     0.98    21.66 
P&C*Childless                         -0.005    -0.71      -0.004    -0.78     1.06 
 
Constant                               0.000    -6.07       0.019    -4.99     1.00 
 
Number of observations                         1,817                1,817 
    Recipients                                   344                  344 
    Nonrecipients                              1,473                1,473 
 
Log-likelihood                                 -786.16           -3745.35 
Chi-squared                                     191.05             107.79 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Authors' tabulations using the NSFH. 
Note: The nested probit adjusts for the sample-selection bias associated with 
restriction of the sample to homebuyers. Purchasing a house, and receiving a housing-
related transfer are estimated jointly. Variables entered in the house purchase 
equation are earnings, permanent income, financial assets, dummies for financial 
assets missing and for low financial assets, a quadratic in the age of the household 
head, per-capita parental income, number of living parents/in-laws, family size, the 
amount of housing equity in wave 1, marital status (married, divorced, married since 
wave 1), female headship status, race (Black), dummy indicating missing value for 
wave 1 home equity, a dummy for inter-city migration since wave 1, dummies for job 
change (respondent and spouse) since wave 1, and dummies for attaining a job 
(respondent and spouse) since wave 1.  Estimated correlation between unobservables in 
the house purchase equation and housing transfer equation: -0.268, std. err. = 0.130. 
The probit equation for house purchase is given in the Appendix “Additional Results,” 
available on request. 
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Table 6. The Incidence of Housing Transfers: 
Households Who Purchased a House Between Survey Waves 
Bivariate Probit Analysis: Transfers to Husbands and Wives Estimated Separately 
Dependent Variable: Transfer Receipt (1=Yes, 0=No) 
 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                                              Husbands                      Wives 
                                       Marginal Asymp. Variable   Marginal  Asymp.  Variable 
                                        effect   t-val.  mean      effect   t-val.    mean 
Respondent Characteristics 
 
Current earnings (000's)                -0.004  -1.32    61.51     -0.002   -0.55    61.51 
Permanent income (000's)                 0.004   1.13    55.61      0.003    0.85    55.61 
Current earnings (000's) X age/100       0.009   1.03    23.12      0.005    0.52    23.12 
Permanent income (000's) X age/100      -0.009  -0.94    20.53     -0.012   -1.02    20.53 
Financial assets<1/6 earnings           -0.112  -1.04     0.39     -0.084   -0.72     0.39 
(Financial assets<1/6 earnings) X age    0.005   1.49    13.51      0.003    0.84    13.51 
Black                                    0.023   0.38     0.04     -0.079   -1.36     0.04 
Distance from parents                    0.008   0.17    -0.13     -0.019   -0.39    -0.11 
Number of own siblings                  -0.015  -2.74     3.38     -0.012   -2.25     3.24 
Have no children                         0.164   1.70     0.15      0.082    1.02     0.15 
Number of children                       0.093   1.52     1.81      0.049    0.89     1.81 
Number of children squared              -0.021  -1.60     4.59     -0.012   -1.08     4.59 
Fertility plans--housing concerns        0.016   3.33     3.93      0.011    2.34     3.93 
 
 
Parental Variables 
 
Per-capita parental income (0000's)      0.068   3.25    1.588      0.053    2.25    1.598 
Father alone                            -0.051  -1.14    0.084     -0.048   -0.88    0.066 
Mother alone                             0.038   0.78    0.267      0.202    3.30    0.217 
Parents together                         0.025   0.70    0.520      0.059    1.67    0.571 
Parent in bad health                    -0.061  -2.16    0.182      0.021    0.70    0.182 
 
 
In-law Variables 
 
Total in-law income (0000's)            -0.007  -0.99    2.365      0.016    2.44    2.319 
Distance from in-laws                    0.004   0.07   -0.112      0.165    2.70   -0.127 
 
 
 
Constant                                 0.010  -4.66    1.000      0.015   -4.34    1.000 
 
Estimated correlation of unobservables                          0.41 
Estimated standard error of correlation                         0.10 
 
Observations                                                    806 
Recipients                                        111                          107 
Nonrecipients                                     695                          699 
Log-likelihood                                                -562.27 
Chi-squared                                                    104.64 
Dependent variable mean                         0.138                        0.133 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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